Presenting Intelligence Findings

The hallmark of an effective corporate competitive intelligence function is how it communicates important CI findings to company decision-makers. There are a variety of ways to communicate key intelligence findings: newsletters, ad hoc reports, email, posts to a CI portal, to name a few. But, one of the most effective methods is a scheduled executive briefing.

Executive briefings offer the opportunity to engage your company's decision-makers on the most pressing intelligence issues. You can also observe body language, hear discussions among executives about the findings you are presenting, and receive questions directly from internal CI clients. Sadly, few competitive intelligence functions include executive briefings among their CI deliverables.

Why? For many functions, gaining access to executives is difficult. However, if competitive intelligence is to serve as a decision-support function, instead of just another research function, direct access to its internal clients is critical. Gaining this access won't happen overnight. CI functions need to demonstrate a history of offering compelling and provocative findings and assessments that directly address executives' concerns and issues. Once the CI function has done that, asking for time on meeting agendas becomes pretty straightforward.

Another reason why executive briefings are a relatively rare CI deliverable is because many CI professionals are not effective presenters. I have seen way too many CI briefings run too long, fail to coalesce findings into a few key themes, and mis-use PowerPoint and other presentation tools. Executive briefings first and foremost need to be short: CI practitioners must be able to condense their most critical findings into a short briefing.

This means potentially leaving considerable details out of the presentation. This is hard for many CI professionals to do. Because they have worked so hard on research and information gathering, they feel compelled to include every fact and figure they have unearthed. The reality is that there is a law of diminishing returns. Two or three pieces of evidence to support any finding is plenty; anything more actually may detract from the strength of the argument.

Executive intelligence briefings must be crisp, dynamic and to the point. PowerPoint slides should be minimalist -- few words, lots of graphics, and compelling. In an executive briefing, the CI professional, not the slide deck, should be the focus of interest. Executives want to listen to you, not read slides. The majority of the intelligence content must be in the presentation, not on in slides.

To that end, I want to share venture capitalist Guy Kawasaki's 10-20-30 rule for PowerPoint presentations. Kawasaki is a managing director of Garage Technology Ventures, an early-stage venture capital firm, and a columnist for Entrepreneur Magazine. Although his 10-20-30 rule was developed for VC presentations, I think it applies to CI executive briefings as well.

Leaping Over the Intelligence - Decision Gap

We all know, intuitively, that competitive intelligence isn’t really intelligence unless it is actionable. If a piece of intelligence doesn’t compel a decision-maker to take action, we are told, it is just another piece of information. But what constitutes action? And, what is the process by which competitive intelligence prompts a decision or strategy that is implemented and subsequently managed? Frequently, even companies that possess world-class competitive intelligence functions struggle with turning credible, insightful, actionable intelligence into a clear strategy, decision, or course of action.

Why is good intelligence often not incorporated into strategic plans or operational decisions? The problem, I believe, rests with reluctance among management to clearly define the role it expects intelligence to play in company decision-making, to define key decision components that are influenced by intelligence, and to track progress against them.

Too often, strategic planning is an exercise in reaffirming what is known or comfortable, or what has worked in the past. Similarly, decision implementation is often an exercise in executing what has worked before. In today's uncertainty, companies are hard-pressed to take new, bold, and decisive action even when all the intelligence “signals” point to the wisdom of pursuing a new course of action. To understand how competitive intelligence can improve both sides of this problem, we need to consider each separately.

CI and Strategic Planning

The successful integration of competitive intelligence into a company’s strategic planning process requires that strategic planning be based on a well-defined framework that clearly defines the role competitive intelligence is expected to play. It doesn’t matter whether the framework is based on popular techniques like scenario planning, is based on ones invented and perfected by your company, or has a particular objective – such as growth – in mind. With a well-defined planning framework, it is easier to define CI’s specific role, and how CI will be considered when developing and implementing the strategy.

What if your company has no identifiable planning framework, or no strategic planning process at all? In these cases, CI can do little more than provide general industry or competitor assessments in the hope they will generate questions that result in a more disciplined approach to strategic development.

CI and Decision Execution

Frequently, competitive intelligence points to the need for a specific decision that is not necessarily a part of a pre-conceived strategic plan. Intelligence early warning, for instance, that describes new competitive developments not directly addressed during the strategic planning process can require managers to make decisions “off plan,” and do so quickly.

In these cases, it is important for the CI manager to identify an issue champion. This is an individual in a decision-making or leadership role whose corporate function is most impacted by the intelligence. For the issue champion to successfully act on new intelligence, the CI manager must brief him or her on the content of the intelligence, and discuss the implications for the company and for his or her function directly. Sometimes, the prospective issue champion will defer to someone else, or include others in the initial discussion about potential decision options once the intelligence is delivered.

The appointment of the issue champion is hardly based on a formal process. The means for identifying the issue champion will differ from issue to issue, and is based on candid conversations between the competitive intelligence manager and the intelligence function’s consumers. One thing, however, is certain. The issue champion must have the authority to determine a course of action based on the intelligence, marshal and manage appropriate resources for decision implementation, and then oversee its execution.

In sum, effective decision implementation following the delivery of an intelligence report requires a sound framework for strategic planning, and the appointment of a decision-level issue champion charged with the task of marshaling the resources for effective decision execution. Simply preparing good intelligence reports is not enough; companies must pay close attention to particular strategic planning frameworks, and how to oversee decision execution over an extended period of time.

An Interview with the US National Intelligence Officer for Warning

Kenneth Knight describes his job as helping the president of the United States and his administration "avoid surprise." As the national intelligence officer for warning, Knight oversees a small team of analysts who serve as an institutionalized safeguard against risk-monitoring and challenging the analyses and assumptions of the broader intelligence community. In this interview, he discusses evaluating threats, overcoming cognitive biases, and constructing scenarios -- challenges familiar to most private-sector strategists. McKinsey's Drew Erdmann and Lenny Mendonca spoke with Knight in Washington, DC, in June 2009.

Outward Insights' business early warning services are modeled on many of the same techniques as used by the US Intelligence Community, including scenario building, indicator definition, and the proactive communication of warning assessments.

A New Paradigm for Competitive Intelligence Training?

Within the past month, two clients have asked me to help them develop training in competitive intelligence for non-CI professionals. Neither of these companies manages a full-time, centralized CI function. Instead, each company's strategic marketing function wants to instill product, brand, and sales managers with core CI skills to enhance their job performance. These companies may, or may not, develop a dedicated CI team; for now, building CI-related skills and competencies among a broader community is more important.

They envision rolling out a series of short, "bite-sized" training modules on various aspects of competitive intelligence (competitor hypothesis generation, human-source network building, intelligence analysis), in some cases as part of a larger, internal training operation. The training would be delivered on-line, via WebEx or Live Meeting or some similar platform, and would include "homework" assignments that will require attendees to apply course material to their specific functions and needs.

The CI training needs of these two companies is emblematic of a broader trend: the decentralization and deprofessionalization of competitive intelligence. For many organizations, especially decentralized, multi-business-line companies, there is more value to be derived from embedding CI skills in other, more well established corporate functions, than from building a dedicated, professional CI program.

Is this wise? Does it further the promotion of CI, or limit it? For me, this deprofessionalization of CI may be a good thing. For one, it brings CI to the masses; there's no reason why professionals in functions related to competitive intelligence can't or shouldn't selectively apply core CI competencies to what they do, especially if doing so enhances decision-making at a variety of levels. It also engages more and more professionals in the conduct of competitive intelligence, potentially bolstering membership in the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) and enhancing the profession by opening it to new ways of doing business. One downside for SCIP, however, is that this new corporate approach to CI may make its proposed certification program meaningless.

To be sure, these decentralized approaches to CI will require stronger coordination and management of intelligence practices, the development of strong communities of practice, and other structural elements, to make it work. But, if more and more people are practicing the craft of intelligence, I see more upside than downside.

Separating CI From the Sleaze

According to a recent article in USA Today, incidents of corporate espionage are on the increase, thanks to cheap, easy-to-use technology devices and increasing numbers of displaced and disgruntled workers due to the recession.

"Corporate espionage using very simple tactics — much of it carried out by trusted insiders, familiar business acquaintances, even janitors — is surging. That's because businesses large and small are collecting and storing more data than ever before. What's more, companies are blithely allowing broad access to this data via nifty Internet services and cool digital devices."

Meanwhile, the proper use of business and competitive intelligence by US companies is also on the increase. In a recent Outward Insights survey, more than seven out of 10 companies surveyed claimed to have an organized and systematic way to collect, analyze, and use competitive intelligence, a seven percent increase over results from a similar survey we conducted in 2005.

These two facts are completely unrelated to each other.

"Corporate espionage" will be with us in good times and bad. Any employee who feels she is "getting her due" by taking sensitive customer lists along after being laid off, or any sales rep who feels he is one-upping the competition by misrepresenting himself to a competitor at an industry trade show just to get information, are not emblematic of the thousands of companies that are practicing legal, ethical and effective competitive intelligence. These acts of lying and stealing are almost always one-off acts committed by ignorant people in the belief that they are securing valuable competitive knowledge, or exacting revenge on an employer who did them wrong.

And in most cases, the individuals committing these acts wind up unemployed, unemployable, or prosecuted. An individual cited in the USA Today piece who had infiltrated a competitor's email accounts was arrested. He subsequently pleaded guilty to felony wiretapping for tampering with the competitor's e-mail. He was sentenced last month to three months probation and ordered to undergo counseling. "There was nothing sophisticated about me getting into their e-mail," he said in an interview. "Honestly, I had no idea that it was illegal."

Individuals committing such foolish acts rarely are working within, or on behalf of, corporate competitive intelligence programs. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that companies managing formal competitive intelligence programs are less likely to behave unethically, as these companies make clear what intelligence activities are acceptable and which ones are not.

The competitive intelligence industry has made great strides over the years disassociating itself from the sleaze of trade secret theft. But, occasional reminders are necessary that there is a stark difference between corporate espionage and competitive intelligence. The latter is an accepted and necessary business function; the former is just utter stupidity.

The Next Internet Revolution Isn't What You Think

Ask any automobile dealer, insurance broker, or retail store manager what has been the single greatest threat to their margins and the answer will most assuredly come back: the Internet. The greater transparency of information and competition engendered by the Internet has transformed some industries for the better (who actually still goes to their local bank branch?), while leaving others in tatters (when was the last time you booked a vacation through a travel agent?).

But just as the dawning of the 21st century saw the Internet dramatically lower, and in some cases dismantle, traditional barriers to entry in a variety of industries, as this decade comes to a close, a new generation of web-technologies threaten to shake-up and squeeze yet another industry: enterprise software.

By now, everyone has heard of ‘cloud’ computing, a concept based upon the conceit that our work need not be tethered to an individual computer or operating system when a universally accepted web-standard allows otherwise. And while many would argue that the Cloud is the future of computing (Google has even recently announced a browser-based operating system called ‘Chrome’ that presumably will support accessing applications in the Cloud), Cloud computing‘s ascension as a feasible alternative will likely be delayed until cheap, high-speed, internet access is as ubiquitous as running water and electricity. Until that time, broad proliferation of Cloud computing will remain a dream.

So if Cloud computing isn’t the software revolution of which we speak, what is? Simply put, it is the advent of sophisticated, free or nearly free web-based tools that can emulate, and often exceed, the features provided by large, often bloated, certainly expensive, software platforms. The maturation of the internet has resulted in free and cheap tools so powerful that many individuals and organizations are foregoing spending tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars per year on platforms designed to achieve largely the same results as free or inexpensive, Internet-based applications. Surprised? You shouldn’t be; if there is one thing history has taught us about the internet, it’s that it dramatically drives down consumers’ costs.

The availability of free or low-cost web-based software tools are now widely available for competitive intelligence applications. When organizations evaluate traditional competitive intelligence software packages (which can run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars), they typically have many overlapping needs including: article summarization, automated competitor website tracking, government regulation tracking, team-based or work-group portals for sharing intelligence analysis and notes, CI workflow, and keyword search trend analysis.

While most CI software vendors can address most, if not all of these needs, few vendors are able to deliver every capability well. In software development, just as anything else, trade-offs are necessary and resources are often allocated towards those features that are most marketable, not necessarily those that are most useful.

That said, with a little research, CI professionals can likely piece together a suite of stand-alone, browser-based, platform-agnostic products that can often be easily integrated into existing workflows that address most, if not all, of their software needs. Indeed, we’ve found that nearly every capability that is offered by the large CI software vendors (including those functionalities listed above) can be easily and cheaply replicated (and in some cases even surpassed) by free or low-cost software offered online.

Granted, this method won’t be suitable for every organization, and it does come with its own drawbacks (such as lack of integration), but for the right CI group on a budget, free and nearly-free online applications can often replicate the features of larger, pricier options, providing an adequate substitute at a fraction of the cost.

Which is the Better Strategy?

According to the New York Times, sales of GPS Navigation Systems -- devices that mount to an automobile dashboard or windshield that tap the Global Positioning System of satellites to determine directions and provide audio turn-by-turn directions and other features -- are on the decline as more smartphones are equipped with GPS capabilities (“Sending GPS Devices the Way of the Tape Deck?” July 7, 2009). Apple’s iPhone, for instance, comes with a map application that uses the phone’s GPS capabilities to do largely the same thing as larger, and often pricier, navigation systems.

Indeed, more than 40 percent of all smartphone owners use their devices to get turn-by-turn directions, according to Compete, a web analytics firm. For iPhone users, the figure is higher at more than 80 percent. Shipments of smartphones in North America are expected to grow by 25 percent this year, with more than 80 percent of them equipped with GPS, according to ABI Research.

Not surprisingly, sales of traditional GPS units from companies like TomTom, Garmin, and Magellan have fallen sharply. TomTom reports that it shipped 29 percent fewer GPS units in the first quarter compared with the same period in 2008. Garmin said that unit sales fell 13 percent in the first quarter compared with the previous year.

Garmin and TomTom, the two leaders in GPS navigation systems, have adopted radically different strategies to deal with this competitive threat. TomTom has announced plans to offer a portable navigation application for the iPhone that would include turn-by-turn directions and audio prompts. Unlike existing GPS apps for the iPhone, TomTom intends to charge a one-time flat fee rather than require users to pay a monthly subscription fee, according to the Times. Doing so makes TomTom available across different platforms, extending the product’s reach.

Garmin, meanwhile, has plans to develop and launch its own combination navigational device and cellphone, called the Nuviphone, later this year. It essentially intends to turn its navigation system into a mobile phone, with sophisticated navigation features that should far outpace current smartphone map applications. In doing so, it will leverage its expertise at developing, selling, and maintaining devices.

Which is the better strategy? On what assumptions do you believe each company’s strategies are based? What obstacles might each encounter as it attempts to respond to the decline in its core business? We’d love to hear your thoughts.