Competitive Urban Legends

We’ve all heard them. "Urban legends" are a sort of modern folklore consisting of stories often thought to be true but that, in reality, are usually false, exaggerated, distorted, or sensationalized. I’m sure you’ve heard the one about unsuspecting business travelers being anaesthetized and then waking up to find that a kidney had been harvested for surgical transplant.

For the most part, urban legends are harmless fun. But many can take on a life of their own and cause those reading or hearing them to think, just for a moment, that maybe if I’m at an ATM and sense danger, I can enter my PIN in reverse and summon the police.

Managers can hold similar myths, stereotypes, and distortions about competitors, industry conditions, or other business matters. It’s hard for executives, especially those who have been in the same industry or with the same company for most of their careers, not to develop deep-seated beliefs about their business environment. There’s always one competitor more aggressive and hungry than you are, or another competitor that certainly has a more favorable cost structure, or a supplier set to go out of business at any moment. These competitive urban legends are endemic to almost every company, and become reinforced over time as more executives buy into them.

Confronting your company’s urban legends with credible evidence may be the right course of action, but doing so can be fraught with risks. If your company is like most, the more deeply held and incontrovertible the urban legend, the more powerful and influential are the executives who espouse it. Challenging their perspective can be dangerous if not done in a logical and systematic manner.

Entering into a debate with a powerful executive places your credibility on the line. Losing such a battle can create personal and career casualties, and harm the overall perception and acceptance of competitive intelligence inside your organization. Still, when approached carefully and thoughtfully, confronting competitive urban legends is a better course of action than turning a blind eye to them.

Consider the following hypothetical example. A computer services firm found itself continually surprised by the actions of a set of competitors its managers thought they knew well. The competitors were underbidding the company for the provision of networking, systems integration, and other technical services performed for the company’s clients. The company was also pricing well out of sync with client expectations. In some cases, it underbid competitors when price did not turn out to be a prevailing decision factor for the customer. In others, it was increasingly losing bids on prices that were too high, sometimes submitting bids 20% higher than those from other competitors. Senior management scratched their collective heads. How in the world could this be happening? Confusion reigned.

During this competitive conundrum, the company’s competitive intelligence team began to hear statements made by management that seemed to be unfounded:

• "Our competitors are bidding on projects as loss leaders just to establish relationships with desired customers."

• "Competitors can’t be lowering their costs by locating their developers and technical staff offshore -- doing so would complicate services delivery and cause customers to lose confidence."

• "That competitor is in trouble; it’s losing money and is desperate for new revenue to avoid having to undergo a significant restructuring later."

Collected evidence did not suggest that competitors were adopting a loss leader approach. Furthermore, credible evidence indicated that a competitor was adopting a significant offshore strategy. And the competitor in alleged financial difficulty? No evidence indicated anything of the kind.

Furthermore, the competitive intelligence team worried that these perceptions not only clouded management’s ability to take action to correct the company’s sales decline, but also paralyzed management from taking any action at all. Strategy and sales meetings became exercises in frustration, with managers citing their company’s misaligned sales approach but remaining at a loss as to what to do about it.

For each competitive urban legend, the competitive intelligence team identified a set of intelligence requirements that, when fulfilled, would give them the evidence required to objectively and logically evaluate the truthfulness of each legend. Using this list of intelligence requirements, the team gathered published-source and human intelligence. They divided the collected data and information into two sets: one that refuted the legends, and one that supported them.

The challenge then became how to successfully (and safely) inform management that several of its competitive perceptions were no longer valid. Most competitive intelligence practitioners focus on the work behind collecting and evaluating information to create practicable intelligence, and sometimes give short shrift to thinking through a communications strategy. In this case, when you have to deliver intelligence that you know is at odds with your management’s prevailing beliefs about the competition, carefully consider the means by which you deliver that message to your decision makers.

In most cases, subtlety does not work.

When calling management perceptions into question, a direct approach usually works best. In this case, the competitive intelligence team first acknowledged the prevailing competitive perceptions, and then arrayed evidence both for and against the perceptions so management could see exactly how the analysts came to their conclusions regarding whether the legends were true. To get their point across, the team presented management’s distorted perceptions directly back to them, labeling them "urban myths." In doing so, the CI team established that a main purpose of the briefing was to call out, and refute, some of management’s beliefs.

In the management briefing, the competitive intelligence team clearly showed the pieces of evidence that supported the competitive urban legends and those that did not. For each legend, the briefing came down on one side or the other, designating a legend as a valid judgment or as an obsolete view of the competitive environment. For validated hypotheses, the competitive intelligence briefing addressed the implications of each for the computer services company’s sales and pricing strategy, and highlighted future circumstances that could change this rationale.

Communicating the competitive intelligence team’s assessment that discounted some of management’s incorrect urban legends was harder. The team stuck very closely to the evidence they presented and, in essence, allowed management to see for itself that their beliefs were no longer valid. Then, for each refuted hypothesis, the team offered alternative assessments that reconciled observed competitive behavior with the evidence collected and the unfavorable results of the recent lost sales.

For each alternative assessment, the team discussed the implications to the computer services company. They also reviewed a corresponding set of intelligence indicators that the team would continue to monitor with an eye toward warning management about future circumstances that could change these new conclusions.

Once you’ve completed your first urban legend analysis, what’s next? Like most competitive intelligence that management receives, a one-time report or briefing is not enough. To effectively prompt management to at least acknowledge that their competitive perceptions could be in error, competitive intelligence teams need a communications strategy that stresses a constant and ongoing review of prevailing hypotheses.

Consider delivering a quarterly update that confronts the competitive urban legends, offers new evidence that either supports or refutes them, and extends your analytic line. Informal reinforcement of your analysis is essential. Listen for comments by executives that are indicative of old, discounted perceptions. Find opportunities to reinforce your analysis that calls such perceptions into question. Urban legend analysis is not about aiming for one grand deliverable, but for finding opportunities to challenge and correct any distorted competitive assumptions on a continuous basis.

To be sure, confronting -- and ultimately changing -- management’s perspective on the competition is difficult, even when that perspective is out of date or based on assumptions and evidence that no longer hold true. Instead of ascribing to and reinforcing those perceptions, a better competitive intelligence strategy is to confront them head on, using inductive, hypothesis-based analysis. Remove debilitating perceptions from management’s mindset that cloud effective decision making. This will take time and persistence, but the benefits to your organization and your competitive intelligence program can be profound.

The Economic Crisis: Will Your CI Function Survive?

Last October, competitive intelligence stalwart Merck & Co. announced that it was cutting 7,200 jobs and closing three research laboratories. At the same time, other blue-chip names – Ford, General Motors, Yahoo, National City – also have announced severe staff reductions. Payrolls fell 500,000 in December, bringing last year’s decline to 2.4 million, the most since 1945, according to the median estimate of economists surveyed by Bloomberg News. Anyone still keeping tabs on their 401 (k) knows that the credit crisis, gloomy earnings forecasts, and a sharp decline in consumer confidence sent stock markets down almost 40 percent in 2008.

What is perhaps most worrisome is that few saw the severity of the downturn as it was taking shape, and many top minds are at a loss to explain it. In a less-than-confidence-inspiring revelation, former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan summed up the economic situation this way, “We are in the midst of a once-in-a-century credit tsunami. Central banks and governments are being required to take unprecedented measures. Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders' equity are in a state of shocked disbelief.”

In times of economic slowdowns, corporations look to cut excess costs. Many a support function – in particular strategic planning and marketing, to name two – are often the first to get whacked. And competitive intelligence, which for most firms is nothing more than a big old cost center in the eyes of the CFO, can have a big target painted on it.

Of course, nothing could be more foolish than to scale back or even eliminate the competitive intelligence function in times of economic uncertainty. If former Fed Chairman Greenspan is in a state of “shocked disbelief” over the the role lending institutions played in the financial crisis, imagine how CEO’s and other top managers are (or aren’t) coping with the impact of the downturn.

That begs the question: for those of you wringing your hands with fear over your CI department’s future, are you asking your managers about their degree of uncertainty regarding future competitive conditions? Now is the time to revisit the very reason why your CI function was established in the first place. Any need expressed by top management to better understand competitive forces, external industry shifts, and specific competitor strategies are magnified today, with an economy in severe decline.

That means that common CI outputs that consist of quarterly competitive landscape reports and monthly competitor profiles just won’t cut it any more. The survival of your CI function may depend on your ability to deliver unique, relevant insights related to helping your company navigate through a tough economy. Now more than ever, your CI deliverables have to go a few steps farther to truly help your management team navigate uncertain economic waters.

To be sure, budgets are shrinking on all but the most essential activities. So make sure that your executives know that CI is an essential activity. Ask yourself: are you providing warning of looming threats and opportunities? Can you clearly link your CI output to key strategic initiatives and objectives at your company? How are your CI efforts helping your company to meet its goals?

For the CI function to survive, cutting back on CI professional development, limiting access to CI best practices, and retrenching away from engagement with external CI experts is the last thing you should be doing. Upgrading your CI function’s output and making the most of challenging economic times requires ongoing access to CI best-practices, a fair degree of risk-taking on your part, and a demonstration of how a well running CI function can help your organization weather what is likely to be a long and deep recession. If you don’t have 110% of your energy focused in this direction, your CI function will not be seen as a valuable asset that is essential to navigating this challenging economy.

Coping Mechanisms for Future Uncertainty

Frustrations abound over most organizations’ inability to effectively deal with future uncertainty, despite a general awareness of the sources of such uncertainty. How can organizations better counter unexpected external developments and surprises?

At the Frost & Sullivan Growth, Innovation and Leadership Executive Congress (San Francisco, September 15-16 2008) I asked 25 director, VP and C-level executives to identify the major sources of strategic surprise in their external environments. The key sources of surprise included:

• Rapid technology advances

• Unforeseen customer demands and needs

• Economic conditions

• Competitor activities and behavior

Perhaps as frustrating as the recurrence of such developments is the near-total lack of control companies have over them. Furthermore, there was widespread agreement that the time and resources firms spend on monitoring the external environment was grossly out of proportion with the time and money spend tracking internal information, further contributing to this “lack of control” feeling.

Similarly, the coping mechanisms companies use to deal with external surprise were fairly consistent -- but deemed, for the most part, to be ineffective. They include conducting ad hoc research studies, conducting one-off brainstorming sessions, and, sadly, doing nothing.

Conduct research. When faced with unforeseen external developments and an urgent need to take action, many companies retrench behind a facade of more information. Consultant studies, project-based research and other variations of data accumulation failed, according to the executives, to yield a greater understanding of the implications of the external events, nor a stronger sense about what to do. Instead, research and data gathering led to a state of “analysis paralysis” that further acerbated the feeling of frustration and hopelessness over companies’ ability to deal with external stimuli.

Brainstorming sessions. While the variety of strategy workshops, brainstorming sessions, and ideation groups tend to result in innovative solutions and approaches for uncertainty management, the transition from idea generation to implementation is weak. The main reason? Lack of clear ownership of response tactics targeted at addressing competitive environment surprise.

Do nothing. Not surprisingly, the least effective approach. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon for companies to ignore external surprises in the hope that they will simply go away.

What, then, can companies do? I believe there are three ingredients to maintaining an effective posture against future competitive uncertainty.

Avoid -- or at least minimize -- surprise in the first place. Companies can begin to reverse the imbalance between external versus internal information monitoring by pursuing an indicator-based intelligence early warning system. Such a process helps organize external intelligence gathering against a set of indicators, or signposts of future change, for which significance has been determined and a strategic response already decided.

Develop flexible strategies. By employing techniques such as scenario-based strategic planning, companies can pursue strategic plans that have flexibility built in, allowing for rapid responses to unforeseen developments within a consistent overall strategic framework.

Link intelligence analysis with strategy implementation. Organizations must ensure that intelligence insights can quickly be communicated to those responsible for owning strategic response implementation. Keeping intelligence gathering and analysis several layers beneath strategic implementation will ensure that relevant insights never get the chance to influence strategic response.

Competitive Intelligence Driving More Corporate Decisions

It's a classic good news / bad news report: more US corporations are using competitive intelligence to drive critical strategic and tactical decisions than ever before, but an alarming number of companies still do not have structured way to deliver intelligence to decision-makers in their organizations. Is the chasm between companies that value CI and those that don’t growing?

Outward Insights conducted its second “Ostriches and Eagles” CI best practices survey, which gauges the effectiveness and use of CI among US companies across industries. The first survey was conducted in 2005. The biggest finding this time around? More and more companies are “getting” the value of competitive intelligence. Most reassuring was the growth among respondents who said that CI was “an integral part of operational or tactical decisions” over the 2005 survey.

Another positive finding was the 72% of respondents that claimed to use CI to “anticipate and thwart competitor strategies” compared with 64% in 2005. This uptick reflects the increasing value executives place in the early warning applications of competitive intelligence.
Among other key findings:

• More respondents (28%) integrate likely competitor reactions into their plans for launching new products than in 2005 (21%)
• The use of scenario planning nearly doubled from 30% in 2005 to 59% this year
• The percentage of respondents who believe CI is “an integral part of the strategic planning process” was at 85%, the same as in 2005.

Despite these findings, obstacles still impede corporations from realizing the full value of competitive intelligence. For example, the survey found that nearly half of respondents say that their CI programs are not sufficiently funded. In addition, 37% of respondents said that CI does not have “sufficient stature” within their organizations. The gains that are evident in the strategic application of CI may be short-lived if these programs are not funded adequately and given proper stature in the organization. The survey also found that almost one in five executives believes that senior managers do not value the competitive intelligence they receive, and 24% of respondents said that their companies lack a formal CI process altogether.

There were some notable differences in the responses from the seven industry groups surveyed: consumer products, energy, financial services, insurance, high-tech, manufacturing, and pharmaceuticals. For example, consumer products companies were least likely to have an organized intelligence function (62% vs. 76% of all respondents), while energy companies were least likely to make CI an integral part of their strategic planning process (71% vs 85% of all respondents).

We conducted the survey in June and July 2008. The survey consisted of telephone interviews with 100 senior executives at US corporations. More than two-thirds of the companies participating had revenues of $1 billion or greater. To request a complete survey report, contact us at info@outwardinsights.com.

Holding On to Old Business Models

IT’S NO SECRET that innovative competitors, new technologies, and regulatory conditions force industry leaders to adapt to new market realities. Why, then, when the writing is on the wall that paradigmatic shifts are occurring in an industry, do most market share leaders try to perpetuate obsolescing business models?

Consider Microsoft. The company announced last year that it would offer a free, Web-based service that works with Word, Excel, and PowerPoint to allow people to store and access files online, according to an article in the Seattle Post Intelligencer. (http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/333748_software01.html)

Clearly, Microsoft is embracing the shift from desktop-based software applications to web-based ones, right? It is responding to the launch in 2006 of Google Docs, a free application that allows users to create and edit word-processing and spreadsheet files online, inside a web browser. It no doubt knows that future growth prospects for its Office software lies in workplace use of Web 2.0 – the use of wikis, Internet delivery of applications, and Web-enabled collaboration – where hosted services, instead of desktop-based applications, are the wave of the future.

Not so fast. Microsoft’s online service, named Office Live Workspace, will require that editing and creating documents still take place on the PC desktop, requiring a regular version of Microsoft Office that users will have to purchase and install on their computers. Why? According to David Smith, an analyst with Gartner, a technology research firm, “They (Microsoft) certainly are not looking to push the envelope and be the leader in providing Web-based Office tools. They need to do it in a way that preserves their business.” Office is Microsoft’s second-biggest product behind Windows.

To be sure, abandoning a market or business model that has served a company well for years is challenging. No company wants to embrace a new business too soon and risk forgoing revenue from a legacy product that still has some life left. Still, holding on to an old business model for too long can cause a market leader to lose its dominant position, perhaps forever. The trick is to maintain market vigilance of indicators of significant change in a way that allows for maximum strategic flexibility.

Take photographic film processing. When was the last time you took a role of film to a local drug store or supermarket to have pictures developed? “Now you can bring your media card in and go to a kiosk and have it printed in a second. Or you can have it printed at a one-hour photo lab. Or you can upload the image to a wholesale facility on the Internet and have it delivered to a retail store,” says Bing Liem, senior vice president of sales for the imaging division of Fujifilm USA, as quoted in The New York Times. (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/09/business/09film.html?_r=1&oref=slogin)

So, how have photography companies responded? As its film business has tanked, Kodak has spent the last few years making a transition to digital technology. This transition balances embracing a new business model with a reasonable extension of an old one.

In the heyday of film, some 25 billion photographic images were not just captured but printed as well, according to the Times article. By 2009, as the use of digital cameras continues to grow, some 135 billion images will be captured, but far fewer printed. The challenge is getting people to print those images out.

According to the Photo Marketing Association, when digital camera owners in the United States do print out their digital images, they usually do so in stores rather than on home printers. So, Kodak is helping retail stores replace their old silver halide photo processing equipment with kiosks that consumers can use to print digital pictures.

Meanwhile, Kodak’s strategy for its film business now calls for targeting third world economies where home computers are less common. It is selling low-cost film cameras throughout Asia, according to a Kodak spokesperson. In August 2007, Kodak posted record sales in India.

By monitoring key indicators – in this case, the propensity of consumers to print digital images in stores rather than at home – Kodak has been able to reposition a key product, photo finishing equipment, to correspond to the obsolescence of film and the rapid growth in digital imaging. Meanwhile, instead of perpetuating its film business in mature markets that have moved beyond film, Kodak now is replicating a business model in markets not yet impacted by digital photography technical advances.

The best of both worlds, to be sure.

Could an early warning system have helped predict our current financial woes?

Much has been said about the causes of the financial crisis to which we are all held captive. Politicians blame each other for the mess, citing varying degrees of under (or over) regulation depending on wind directionality, Wall-Streeters blame avaricious mortgage lenders and profligate home-buyers, consumers blame greedy executives and the politicians beholden to them, and media pundits blame everyone. The interesting question, however, isn’t so much who was to blame, but more, what were the signposts along the way that, had they been identified beforehand, could have helped authorities avert the disaster. In other words, could a unified financial early warning system have helped predict and forestall our current financial woes?

To be fair, foreknowledge of the current crises would likely not have been enough to avert it (excessive systemic risk is purged from markets in one way or another) but surely paying attention to the warning signs (of which there were many) would have allowed governments to shore up soon-to-be faltering banking systems or at least ensure that adequate policy measures were in place that would help to guide the flailing, seemingly haphazard decisions that policy makers have made in the last few weeks.

So what, exactly, would the harbingers of a doomed economy look like, and where would one look to find them? Well for starters at least, historically speaking the major economic downturns have been preceded by a marked uptick in panicky investor behavior. In other words: volatility. Well, you may ask, by the time investors and policy-makers have noticed that volatility is on the upswing, isn’t it likely far too late to take decisive action? That depends upon your definition of too late. To be sure, the tell-tale signs of volatility began appearing as early as July and August of 2007. In fact, the Chicago Board of Trade’s Volatility Index or VIX (often referred to as the Fear Index), began a series of what should have been alarming spikes on mounting concerns about, what was at the time, a growing credit crisis. Granted, increased volatility does not necessarily mean a marked downturn, but had policy-makers created an integrated system of early warning indicators that included volatility monitoring, a VIX spike could have put them on alert.

Remember those Wall-Streeters and bankers who were looking for someone to blame? Well it turns out that they had advanced warning of what was going on in the credit markets and broader economy as well. How, you ask? As we’ve all come to know, inter-bank lending is in many ways the life-blood of our economy. When the credit markets freeze up, banks stop lending to one another (well technically they don’t stop lending, they simply charge prohibitive inter-bank rates which in and of itself is a measure of risk and uncertainty in the overall economy). Often referred to as the TED Spread, the difference between Treasury yields and the London Interbank Offered Rate measures the degree to which banks feel that their peers will default on inter-bank loans, or counter-party risk. In fact, that summer the TED Spread saw a spike to levels it hadn’t seen since the Black Monday crash of 1987. So how far back did banks begin panicking? You guessed it, the same exact time the VIX was spiking towards the end of summer 2007.

These are but two of several examples of potential indicators you are likely to hear about in the coming weeks and months. Again, while any one of these signals doesn’t necessarily mean that an economy is doomed, had the right people, armed with a list of triggers or indicators, been paying attention, policy-makers could have taken steps much sooner. When you think about the hysteria of the last few weeks, the speed with which Secretary Paulson tried to cram the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 through congress, the ensuing equity market melt-down, and about the shape of things to come, think about how different things might have been if those who hold the public trust had done their jobs.

On second thought, the really interesting question isn’t what the early warning indicators might have looked like, it’s why our leaders weren’t looking for them to begin with. Truth be told, governments should have begun taking action to quash the mounting crisis more than a year ago.

The Paranoid Still Survive

Ten years after former Intel CEO Andy Grove wrote his best-selling book Only the Paranoid Survive, a report in USA Today (January 31, 2007) suggests a healthy dose of insecurity is still at the heart of CEO success. "I am driven by fear of failure," says Dennis Manning, CEO of Guardian Life Insurance of America, which has annual revenue of more than $7 billion. "It's a strong motivator for me. If I fail, maybe 50,000 people fail with me."

What do CEO's worry about? According to the PricewaterhouseCoopers 10th Annual Global CEO Survey, 37 percent of those CEOs interviewed worry about pandemics, 40 percent about global warming, and 50 percent about terrorism. The overall optimism expressed in the survey is also tempered by other considerations tied to obstacles to growth. CEOs cite the uncertain availability of skilled resources, overregulation, and low-cost competition as impediments to future growth. And, sources of future growth most often cited in the survey include penetrating new markets, M&As, and technical innovation, all areas with higher levels of risk than less venturesome options such as better penetration of existing markets.

What does all this mean for strategy and competitive intelligence? Lots. CEO intelligence needs are more complex than ever. Corporate CI practitioners have to maintain vigilance against a wide array of risks, from bird flu to offshore competitors. More importantly, against a wide array of risks, from bird flu to offshore competitors. More importantly, they have to continuously feed their CEO's paranoia. "Healthy doses of corporate insecurity help keep a company fresh and competitive and ensure that the leadership and drive . . . remain active," says Ciena CEO Gary Smith, as reported in USA Today. Intelligence reports and approaches to strategy that harness this paranoia -- by generating plausible future scenarios and corresponding strategy options -- can be highly successful. According to Martin Frid-Nielsen, CEO of telecommunications company SoonR, "Paranoid people often see problems long before their more complacent counterparts. A little bit of insecurity goes a long way to push a company toward perfection, especially when that insecurity resides in the CEO."

A dose of paranoia may be what this troubled economy needs.